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1. Introduction  
The water service in Northern Ireland has been the subject of a series of initiatives in the last 5 years. 
Hitherto the water service in Northern Ireland has been provided as part of the services of the Department of 
Regional Development (DRD), which has been financed through property-based rates and support from 
general UK taxation, without any separate water charge (similar to the system used throughout the UK 
before 1974).  In 2003 the UK government produced a consultation document on reforms, proposing the 
introduction of a new charge for water services, additional to the rates paid for local services in Northern 
Ireland, and presenting a range of options for restructuring the service, including privatisation on the model 
of the English companies. These proposals were the subject of a previous PSIRU report.1 
 
The responses to this consultation were overwhelmingly hostile, both to the proposed new charge and to the 
principle of privatisation. The UK government nevertheless decided to proceed with the introduction of the 
new charge and the creation of a government owned company (“GoCo”) structured like a private company 
but owned by the DRD, which is responsible for water services in Northern Ireland.  The new charge and the 
new company – Northern Ireland Water – were both set up from April 2007.2  A number of public private 
partnerships (PPPs) were also created as vehicles for capital investment under the private finance initiative, 
notably for new treatment works. 
In parallel to this process, elections for the Northern Ireland assembly were held in 2007, in which the 
proposed new water charge was a prominent issue. Following these elections, a new Northern Ireland 
executive with devolved powers was set up in May 2007. At its first meeting the new executive decided to 
cancel water charges for 2007/08 and set up a comprehensive review of water services.3  
This paper is divided into three sections.  
 
 The first section analyses the impact on operating costs, capital costs and charges of the government 
plans as at April 2007 – the creation of the GoCo and the introduction of the new charge.  
 
 The second section discusses some of the issues raised by the plans, including the burdens of the 
proposals for assigning equity and debt to the water service. 
 
 The third section sets out an alternative approach. 
 
The data is drawn from the main official documents, in particular: 
 Financial Framework for Northern Ireland Water Ltd  (referenced as FFNIW) 
www.waterreformni.gov.uk/financial_framework-2.pdf  
 Strategic Business Plan: Northern Ireland Water 3 May 2007 (referenced as SBP)  
http://www.niwater.com/siteFiles/resources/word/03%2005%2007%20SBP%20_final.doc  
 
2. Current plans for the water service 
2.1. Operating expenditure 
The SBP expects operating expenditure to rise sharply in the first year, from £159.4m. in 2006/07 to 
£190.1m. in 2007/08.  This is an increase of £30.7m., or 19%.  Operating expenditure is then expected to 
remain around £190m for the next six years. b   
 
2.1.1. Transformation costs 
The SBP states that the details of operating costs are still being developed, and lists a number of elements 
including operational reviews, new human resource and financial systems, and development of the 
„organisational culture‟. c    
                                                     
b SBP 5.11 
c SBP 5.23 
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However, it is clear that the immediate effect of the reforms themselves is to increase the costs of the water 
service.  The SBP summary identifies the administrative costs of the reform process itself; the cost of 
administering the new water charge;  and the employer‟s national insurance and pension costs which have 
been transferred by the UK government from general UK taxation to the revenue account of NIW. While the 
annual costs of creating the new GoCO are expected to fall after the first two years, the cost of the new 
billing system is projected to rise to £28.9m in 2013/14.  The overall effect is that these costs of the new 
system add over £50m per year to operating costs for the next 7 years (see table 2).   
 
They represent over 27% of all operating costs throughout the period, and are greater than or equal to the 
projected efficiency savings until the last year of the period. 
 
2.1.2. Efficiency savings 
The SBP intends to make efficiency savings which will reduce operating expenditure between 2006/07 and 
2009/10 by £44m. below what it would otherwise have been. These efficiencies are very largely achieved 
through labour costs, principally by a 27% reduction in employees, from 1,926 in 2006/07 to 1,412 in 
2009/10 – a cut of 514 jobs. These reductions are to be achieved through a combination of reorganization, 
new technology and working methods, together with some outsourcing of customer contact work and staff 
transfers to the PPP operators.d  
 
Table 1.  Staffing reductions planned by NIW 2006/07-2009/10 
(as at 31 March) 2006/7 2007/8 2008/9 2009/10 
Total  1,926 1,881 1,716 1,412 
Difference - (45.5) (210.5) (514.0) 
Difference as % - (2) (11) (27) 
 
Source: SBP 5.16 p. 26 
 
2.1.3. Net effect on operating expenditure 
The net effect is that all the savings achieved by the efficiency measures are more than consumed by the 
costs of reorganization until the final year of the plan, 2013/14, when the efficiency savings become equal to 
the additional costs of reorganization.  The staffing cuts are paying for the costs of reorganization.  Table 2 
and Chart A present the figures. 
 
Table 2.  Impact on operating costs of reforms and efficiency savings 
  2006/07 2007/08 2009/10 2013/14 
Business transformation and VER   20.0 12.7 11.4 
Customer billing   18.4 26.3 28.9 
Regulatory payments   3.5 4.0 4.5 
Pensions and national insurance   12.0 10.5 9.4 
TOTAL extra costs of reforms   53.9 53.5 54.2 
      
Efficiency savings   -29.8 -44.0 -55.6 
Out of:      
Total operating costs:  159 190 188 196 
Source: calculated from SBP 6.11 p.33; Appendix A, p.41 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
d SBP 5.13-5.16 
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Chart A. Changes in NIW operating costs 
Change in NIWL Operating Costs
from 2006/07 to 2009/10
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Source: SBP section 6.1.1, p. 35 
2.2. PPPs/PFI: operating and capital expenditure 
The expenditure on the PFI schemes represents a significant growth item, rising from around £2m. in 
2007/08 to £38m. by 2009/20, and remaining at roughly the same level for the rest of the period.e  Of this 
£38m., about £30m. represents capital costs, and £8m. operating expenses. This capital cost of £30m per year 
PPPs is equal to between a third and a quarter of the costs of capital investment.  
 
Because of the contractual obligations built into PFI schemes, PPPs represent costs which are almost 
unalterable for their lifetime of 25 years or more.  
 
Although most of the cost of PPPs is due to the cost of capital, the PPP schemes will be treated by the 
regulator as operating costs. NIAUR will scrutinise any changes in costs and “if found unacceptably 
inefficient will be borne by the company and not adjusted in tariffs”f.  This means that the penalty for 
inefficiencies in the PPPs will be applied by cutting resources available for the rest of the water service, not 
by increasing charges, which has been the general practice with PFI schemes in the UK – even where the 
inefficiencies result from the original terms of the contract as approved by the UK government.4 
2.3. Capital expenditure 
Capital expenditure plans are now higher than previous plans. Up to 2003 all plans indicated capital 
expenditure of about £150m. per year. The new plans show a significant increase to levels over £250m. until 
a decline from 2010 onwards.  As a result, the costs associated with this capital expenditure programme – 
depreciation and the infrastructure charge – rise steadily from £48m. in 2007/08 to £66m. in 2009/10 and to    
£92m. in 2013/14 (as do interest payments on the debt that grows to finance this investment – see below). 
Table 3.  Capital expenditure in NIW plans 
  2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 Total 
Capital works programme 230 211 226 212 202 184 171 1436 
Adjustments   43 45 27 14 14 15 16 172 
Capital expenditure 273 256 253 226 216 199 187 1608 
Source: SBP 4.12 p.17 
 
                                                     
e  SBP Appendix A p.41 
f  FFNIW p.9 
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The increase in capital expenditure for 2007/08 is explained in very general terms as: “reflecting a more 
detailed assessment and audit of the costs of delivering the necessary improvements in infrastructure to meet 
performance criteria confirmed as appropriate by the Environmental and Water Quality Regulators”g.  The 
reference to the water quality regulator is odd, as the government states that “75% of the capital programme 
is devoted to sewerage assets in the first 3 years”. The justification of the capital spending programme and its 
profile over time is obscure, as ERINI observed of an earlier version: “It is very difficult to say whether an 
investment programme of this scale and complexity is optimal or not”5. The criteria, the assessments of the 
regulators, and the audit should all be published to enable public debate on this judgment.  
 
The programme beyond 2010 is even less certain, as it “assumes that major investment will be required” 
[emphasis added], and will be reviewed in 2009 as part of the regulatory process for setting prices thereafter.  
 
The planned level is significantly higher than in England and Wales: £375 per household per year, more than 
double the £165 per household per year in England and Wales. h In reality the increase and the difference 
with England and Wales is even higher, because the bulk of the expenditure on PPPs is in effect payment for 
capital investment: if the cost of PPPs was added to the capital expenditure programme, then it would be 
about 50% higher again.i 
2.4. Cost of capital: interest, dividends and capital gains 
NIW has been assigned a regulatory capital value (RCV) of £800m., comprising £150m. debt and £650m. 
shareholder capital (equity). 
 
The £150m of debt is in the form of loans from the DRD, at 5.25% annual interest, which implies an annual 
interest cost of £7.9m. This interest rate is much higher than the actual cost of borrowing to the government: 
a recent study for OFWAT estimated the real „risk-free‟ rate of government bonds as about 2.5%, and the 
real cost of UK government index-linked bonds is around 2%.6 
 
The capital expenditure planned in the coming years will also be financed by extra debt, in the form of 
revolving loans from DRD. The total debt will thus increase from £150m to £1,066m. in 2013/14 – a rise of 
£916m. The interest bill will rise to £31m. in 2009/2010, and to £55.0m in 2013/14.   
 
The equity capital consists of shares, also held by DRD. The value of these shares has been set at £650m., 
plus £21.1m. from windfall sale of assets (see below). NIW is expected to pay dividends worth 5.1% each 
year, which implies dividends of £34m. in 2007/08; by 2009/10 this will have increased to £36m., and by 
2013/14to £48m. per year. 
 
These dividend payments are the result of the government‟s decision: “that the new company should deliver 
sustained positive returns to the taxpayer (as shareholder)” This “represents the opportunity cost that the 
government faces when investing taxpayers funds in one particular business activity rather than another”. j 
 
The business plan provides for the growth in RCV from £650m. to over £2billion in 2013/14. This is treated 
as capital gains to a quasi-private investor, and, combined with dividends, provides total shareholder returns 
of over 10%.k 
Table 4.  Cost of capital 2006/07 – 2013/14 
  2006/07 2009/10 2013/14 
Annual dividends  0 36 48 
Annual interest   6 31 55 
Source: SBP 6.5 p.31, 6.12 p.35 
 
                                                     
g FFNIW p.11 
h FFNIW p.11 
i SBP Appendix A p.41, and p.35, chart. The SBP shows PPP costs of £38m. by 2009/10, of which £8m. are said to be 
operating costs, so £30m. represent costs of capital investment. 
j FFNIW p.17 
k SBP 6.5 p.31 
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The government is allowing NIW to inherit assets from the water service which are deemed surplus to 
requirements. NIW is permitted to sell these and retain the proceeds as a one-off windfall. This is in line with 
what the English and Welsh companies were allowed to do after privatisation. It is an arbitrary way of 
providing an unsustainable windfall income. The uncertainty is highlighted by the fact that the text of the 
SBP claims that the sales will yield £21.1m. l , but the cash flow projections only show a total of  £11m. 
expected from these sales – barely half the figure claimed in the text.m 
2.5. Overall effect: higher costs 
The chart and tables below summarise the impact of different decisions on costs.  
 
Table 2 shows that the increase in costs is spread roughly equally between the rising cost of interests, 
dividends, PPPs, depreciation, and operating costs. Of these, the cost of dividends is a simple consequence of 
a government decision; the cost of interest on debt is also in part the result of a government decision; and the 
cost of the PPPs is enshrined in contracts which were As shown above, the increase in operating costs is also 
entirely due to the costs of creating NIW itself. 
 
The table also shows that the increases in all factors are most heavily loaded into the next three years. By 
2010, the costs of the service increase by £144m, a rise of about 65% in just 3 years. Over the 4 years from 
2010, the increase is less sharp: a rise of £72m., a rise of 20% over 4 years.  
Table 5.  Principal costs borne by water service 2006/07-2013/14 
 2006/07 2007/08 2009/10 2013/14 Increase 
2006/07-
2009/10 
Increase 
2006/07-
2013/14 
Operating expenditure 159 190 188 196 29 37 
Expenditure on PPPs 2 2 38 40 36 38 
Depreciation/infrastructure renewal charge 48 48 66 92 18 44 
Dividends 0 34 36 48 36 48 
Interest 6 11 31 55 25 49 
TOTAL 215 285 359 431 144 216 
Source: SBP  
Chart B. Growth in cost factors 2006-2007-2013/14 
                                                     
l NIW 6.13  
m  NIW p.43 
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Growth in cost items in NI water 2006/07-2013/14
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Source: Table 5 
 
2.6. Charges 
The financial statements in the SBP show the projected revenue and expenditure of NIW compared with the 
past figures for the water service. A new water charge is introduced, reflecting “the plans of the Direct Rule 
Government to introduce from 1 April 2007 charges for domestic customers”n.  The target figure of £334 in 
2009/10 is “the average level of charges that will apply in England and Wales in the three year period to 
2009/10”.o 
Table 6.  New water charges: £ per household per year 
New water charges 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 
Water   £49 £102 £159 
Sewerage   £51 £112 £175 
Combined Water & Sewerage   £100 £214 £334 
Source: SBP 6.7 p.32 
 
The figures given by NIW for past years set out the government‟s retrospective view of the financing of 
water services in the past. This shows income from user charges of only £37m. in 2006/07 and earlier (which 
represents the charges paid by non-domestic users). This reflects the government‟s insistence that households 
in Northern Ireland have made no contribution to the cost of the water service in the past. This claim is 
strongly rejected by many (see below for further discussion), and also conflicts with the 1999 government 
consultation paper, which stated that over three-quarters of the total expenditure of £195m was financed by 
the rates, which provided £150m.7 
 
A large part of the new charge proposed for domestic households represents a transfer of costs from general 
government to households in Northern Ireland. These include the shift in the burden of financing staff 
insurance and pensions, the introduction of dividend and interest income to government, and the shift of the 
cost of PPPs onto NIW.  Collectively these represent an extra £145m. per year by 2013/14, one-third of the 
total costs of £431m. 
                                                     
n SBP 6.6 p.31 
o FFNIW p.13 
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Table 7.  Costs transferred from government to N Ireland users 
 2009/10 2013/14 
Transfer of staff NI and pensions 10 9 
Dividends 36 48 
Interest 31 56 
PPPs (-opex element of £8m) 30 32 
Total 107 145 
   
Government subsidy in NIW plans -62 -54 
   
Net government gain from changes 45 91 
Source: SBP, various 
 
Overall, the proposed charges as set out in the government and NIW papers can be seen as the net result of 
two sets of changes: the increased operating and capital costs associated with the GoCo, and the transfer of 
the burden of financing from tax revenue to the new water charge to domestic users.  
3. Discussion 
Some major issues arising from the plans concern: 
 
- The impact of restructuring on operating costs 
- the impact of the equity and debt loaded onto NIW 
- the dividends required from NIW 
- the lack of an equivalent of the „green dowry‟ 
- the use of privatisation as a model for the Northern Ireland water service 
- the rationale for a new water charge 
3.1. Restructuring increasing costs 
The entire restructuring of the water service should be reconsidered. The additional costs are substantial, and 
absorb the entire planned efficiency savings, yet neither the government‟s financial paper nor the strategic 
plan make any attempt to quantify any benefits of the GoCo structure.  
3.2. Level of equity and debt: no green dowry 
The issue of shareholder equity in NIW only came into existence in 2007 as an accounting item when NIW 
was created. The proposed figure of £650m. is an arbitrary political choice, again based on treating the 
company as if it was privatised. The original estimate of the total value of all the assets of the water service 
was about £6 billion. This was slashed by a simple political decision: “Government had decided that the 
opening asset value of NIW…should be £1 billion and that all of this should be reflected in the opening 
balance sheet of the company as equity”.p The arbitrariness of these figures was re-emphasised when the 
opening value was revised to £800m. (of which £650 m is equity and £150m. is debt) accompanied by a 
claim of magnanimity that s £800m “represents some £5.2 billion write-down of the value of the assets in 
water Services accounts”q. The equity value could equally well be reduced to a token amount of just £1, 
which is an option used by some countries. 8 
 
The impact of assigning capital is equivalent to retrospective charging for the existing assets of the water 
system. Any capital assigned to a new water company in Northern Ireland can only represent assets created 
by past investments. All past expenditure on the water service, both capital and operating, has been financed 
in accordance with the law and practices prevailing at various stages over the last 150 years. Assigning any 
of this as equity or debt on which NIW must pay dividends and interest is in effect forcing the people of 
Northern Ireland to pay again for something which has already been paid for. 
                                                     
p  FF p.18-19 
q FF p.19 
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3.3. Dividends and equity 
The level of dividends expected of NIW also reflects the government use of a private model. The 
government argues that investors would want an extra high return on their investment because NIW is more 
risky than the English and Welsh water companies, for example. The government has therefore set the 
overall cost of capital at 6.4%, compared with the target level of England and Wales of 5.8%. r 
 
There are three flaws in this approach. Firstly, the government is not a private profit-maximising investor – it 
may choose to make investments for other, social and economic, reasons, and investment in water services is 
one such purpose. Unlike private companies, public authorities are not obliged to maximise profits or 
distribute them, so they can decide as a matter of policy that their water undertakings should pay no 
dividends, so that surpluses can only be reinvested into the water system itself, and not used for example to 
reduce taxes for other services. This is done by a number of Dutch municipalities, for example, and by the 
New Zealand public authorities which own the water supply undertaking Watercare: this undertaking 
nevertheless has an excellent international credit rating of A+.9 
 
Secondly, this treats the company as if it was a private investor which might decide to sell up and abandon 
the investment in water altogether if there were too many political uncertainties, for example. But 
governments cannot do this with essential public services. The only way in which this „equity‟ could be 
invested elsewhere would be by selling NIW to a private investor, so the approach only makes sense if 
privatisation is the ultimate objective. 
 
Thirdly, shareholders in a private company normally expect to carry some risk when they invest. The UK 
government however appears to be insisting that there will always be a positive return on equity – “It is also 
the Government‟s intention that the new company should deliver sustained positive returns to the taxpayer 
(as shareholder)” s - and that this return on equity will be fixed at 5.1%.  Not only is this return fixed, it is a 
condition of the UK government‟s financial support for the DRD, which requires: “that the capital charge in 
the DRD Departmental Expenditure Limit (DEL) budget would be set at the same level as the return that 
NIW should earn. This would therefore require DRD to extract NIW‟s return to cover its cost of capital 
charge.” t In effect, the government‟s funding to DRD‟s other services will be cut pound for pound if DRD 
does not extract the dividend payment from NIW.  
3.4. Debt and the missing dowry 
NIW has been assigned £150m. of debt from its first year. This is the exact opposite of what was done for the 
private companies in England and Wales when they were privatised in 1989: the UK government gave them 
a „green dowry‟ capital injection of £6.6 billion by writing off all the existing debts of the water companies - 
worth over £5 billion pounds - plus a further donation of £1.6 billion pounds to help finance investment to 
higher standards. This dowry was paid for out of general taxation, and so Northern Ireland taxpayers made a 
contribution to it without, so far, receiving any benefit. The equivalent for Northern Ireland today would 
need to be adjusted in line with the population difference, officially reckoned as 3.4% 10– and increased to 
account for inflation since 1989, which rose by 72.0% between 1989 and 2006.11  This calculation gives a 
figure of. £386m. 
Table 8.  A proportionate dowry for Northern Ireland 
  
Dowry for England and Wales  1989 £6600m. 
Inflation 1989-2006 +72.0% 
Population adjustment 3.4% 
Proportionate dowry for Northern Ireland £386m. 
Source: see text 
This could be spread over any reasonable period. If it was spread over the next 10 years, it could reduce costs 
by £39m per year compared with the NIW plans; spread over the 7 years of the SBP, it could reduce annual 
costs by £55m; if assigned to the first 5 years, when capital spending is at its peak, it would provide an 
annual reduction of £77m. 
                                                     
r FF p.18 
s FF p. 17 
t FF p.18 
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The interest rate of 5.25% should also be reviewed.  
3.5. Abnormality and problems of privatisation models 
Much of restructuring attempts to create NIW as an asset that private investors would want to buy. Although 
it is a GoCO, the NIW is structured to allow it to operate as a private company. The financial plans are 
constructed to satisfy shareholders for whom the investment is purely financial, and so the concerns are to 
emphasise the returns achieved and the growth in market value of the company as a saleable entity. The SBP 
and the regulatory model assume that the key incentives for owners and managers are to increase the 
financial value of the owners‟ investment. The capital structure is designed to provide a reflection of the 
market value of the company.  
 
However there is no compelling reason to do this for a public service company. There has been a 
considerable debate in the accountancy journals on the problems of introducing such an approach, typified 
by the following quote: 
 
“standards, which aim to improve the financial reporting of large enterprises that are quoted on the 
stock exchange. Such a framework serves the user who is interested in the profitability and in the 
economic results of the organization. However, governments are not driven by profitability or by 
economic results: they have to perform social services with the least effort and do so in an 
accountable way. Therefore, one could seriously question the appropriateness of a conceptual 
framework derived from a specific group of enterprises.” 12 
 
The proposals are excessively influenced by the privatised structure of water in England. However, this is an 
abnormal model for water services. There are very few places in the world where water services have been 
privatised. The form of privatisation in England and Wales, whereby the entire system is owned by the 
private companies, has not been adopted by any other country or city in the world. In all other countries, 
water services remain overwhelmingly provided by public authorities or companies wholly owned by public 
authorities: in the USA for example about 85% of water remains in the public sector.  In the Netherlands, 
private ownership of a water service company is actually illegal; Italy is in the process of passing similar 
legislation.13  
 
This general reluctance to privatise water reflects a number of well-known problems with private provision 
of monopoly services, including high prices. A recent study in France showed that the average price of water 
for households provided by private companies is 16% higher than water provided by the public sector. (€176 
per year compared with €151 per year).14  In England and Wales, the leakage rates of the private companies 
are at high levels more typical of eastern Europe than other western European countries; the companies 
consistently invest less than they predict in their plans; and productivity has grown less rapidly than under 
previous public ownership.15  Water privatisation remains deeply unpopular in Britain, 17 years after the 
water companies of England and Wales were privatised.  In June 2006, 56% of people in an opinion poll 
agreed that the country “would have fewer problems with water supplies if the industry was renationalised 
and the private companies replaced with a government-owned water board”, while 38% disagreed.16    
 
The problems of faith in the unusual English system are also apparent in the regulatory structure proposed. 
NIAUR is modelled on OFWAT in England and Wales, which operates by comparing the efficiency of the 
different companies; and setting price caps on the basis of assumed efficiency gains, allowing the company 
to keep the surplus revenue if it outperforms the assumptions.u 
 
Neither of these functions seems relevant to the situation in Northern Ireland. Firstly, NIAUR only covers a 
single water company, NIW, and so cannot carry out comparisons in the manner of OFWAT. Secondly, the 
incentive of retaining surplus efficiency gains only works for a profit-maximising entity, such as a privately 
owned company; otherwise, the company has no incentive to seek such a surplus. The private companies in 
England fulfil this criterion, but that is not the case for NIW, even though it is constituted as a plc.17  There is 
of course an incentive to reduce costs in order to keep prices down, but this is a political incentive for any 
government service organisation, not an economic incentive that can be manipulated by regulation. Finally,   
                                                     
u FF pp 4-5. 
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the initial price levels for 2007/08-2009/2010 are fixed entirely by the government (“the department will set 
the revenue requirement and charges that will apply for the first three years”v) – so until 2010/11 NIAUR can 
only rubber stamp the prices set by government.  
3.6. The new water charge and ‘full cost recovery’ 
The proposed water charge has three remarkable features. 
 
Firstly, it is a new charge on top of the existing system of payment for water services. The system of 
financing water in Northern Ireland has been the same as the historic system in the UK, namely payments as 
part of the local rates. This was recognised by the 1999 consultation paper which acknowledged that “the 
contribution this year by the average domestic ratepayer in Northern Ireland for water and sewerage 
services is £127”. 18  Those payments, according to the paper, had “been rising in recent years to reflect 
increasing levels of investment” and further increases were expected.  The paper then estimated that 
“increasing the Water Services annual income by an additional amount of £50million would represent an 
increase of approximately 10% in the average domestic rates bill (roughly £35 per annum…)”19. The 1999 
consultation paper gave clear information on all sources of funding. Over three-quarters of the total 
expenditure of £195m was financed by the rates, which provided £150m; charges for commercial water use, 
trade effluent charges and connection charges, provided £36m; and the balance of £9m came from  central 
government.20   
 
Secondly, the level of the charge has not been set by the costs of the service, but as a political decision by 
reference to the average level of payments in England and Wales. This is made clear in the government‟s 
paper on finance which states that: 
 
“Shaun Woodward (who was then the Minister for Regional Development) announced on 8 
December 2005 the Government‟s intention to set the new household charges in line with the 
average level of charges that will apply in England and Wales in the three year period to 2009/10. 
Thus, the Government is setting the new domestic charges in line with the average level of charges 
that will apply in England & Wales in the three years to 2009/10, and these will be phased in over 
that period.”w 
 
The clear implication is that the entire strategic business plan of NIW has been constructed in order to 
come up with the pre-determined level of charges. Instead of the real costs of the water service 
determining the charges, the political target for charges has determined the spending and financial 
plans of NIW. Against this background, the strategic business plan has little credibility as an 
independent management assessment. 
 
Thirdly, the new charge is not a charge based on water consumption, but a tax based on exactly the same 
property rates, using the same new capital values, as the domestic rates. It is identical in effect to a further 
increase in the rates. The main impact of creating it as a separate charge is to require an additional 
bureaucracy to administer it, which is one source of the additional costs of the GoCo restructuring. It would 
clearly be more efficient not to create such a separate element but to continue to raise revenue for DRD 
services through a single rates bill. 
 
Part of the justification used for the new charge is the suggestion that „full cost recovery‟ is compulsory 
under European law, and that this means that users have to pay the full costs. This is not true: the EU Water 
Framework Directive (WFD) does not require the introduction of specific user charges. The WFD says (Art 
9 para 1) that member states must “take account of the principle of recovery of costs of water services”, and 
ensure “that water-pricing policies provide adequate incentives for users to use water resources efficiently” 
and “an adequate contribution”. But the definition of an adequate contribution is left wide open, and 
“member states shall not be in breach if they decide in accordance with established practice not to apply” 
these requirements (Art 9 para 4).  Moreover, in most countries there are significant contributions from 
general taxation. In Germany, a third of all capital expenditure is financed out of government tax revenues. 
The Republic of Ireland continues to use a system of financing water entirely through tax revenues. In 
                                                     
v FF p.7 
w FF p.13 
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Hungary, all investment is financed by central government out of tax revenues. France uses a special 
regional tax to finance investment. The same is true elsewhere: in the USA, revolving funds for investment 
in water and other infrastructure are heavily subsidised by central government. 
 
The new business plans note that commercial and industrial users pay £40m in charges at present, but say 
little about the future plans for these charges. The paper implies that all increases in capital investment must 
be financed solely by charges to domestic users. This is either an oversight, or needs justification.  
4. An alternative path  
It is possible to use this critique to construct the outlines of an alternative basis for planning water services in 
Northern Ireland.  An alternative approach would abandon a number of political objectives embedded in the 
current plans, including: 
– the introduction of a new water charge 
– the objective of setting the charge at the average level for England and Wales 
– the restructuring of the water service as a GoCo (which increases operating expenditure by 27%) 
– the use of privatisation as a model for the water service company 
– the requirement for £54m. annual dividends 
 
This could produce a different set of projections for future years. The costs associated with restructuring 
would be eliminated; the burden of dividends would be removed; and a dowry of £386m., equivalent to the 
England and Wales dowry (see above) could be spread over 10 years. This would sharply reduce the costs to 
be financed, although depreciation and interest costs are still borne by the water service.  
 
This is illustrative. Other elements could also be critically examined, including possible exaggerations of the 
necessary capital programme, possible exaggerations of the desirable level of job cuts, and whether it would 
be more appropriate for the UK government to be responsible for financing the PPP schemes. 
Table 9.  An alternative budget for the NI water service: expenditure  
 2009/10 2013/14 
Opex 188 196 
- restructuring costs -54 -54 
PPPs 38 40 
Depreciation/infra charge 66 92 
Interestx 23 47 
- dowry  -39 -39 
Total to be financed 222 282 
Source: calculated from SBP: for assumptions see text. For more detail see annex 
 
The calculation of the financial implications of these plans is based on the distribution of the burden of 
financing as implied in the NIW strategic plan, which assigns 67.8% of the burden of financing the 
service to the household sector, with 32.2% financed by commercial users.  The result is that the 
2009/10 budget could be financed by a contribution through the rates rising to £221 per household per 
annum - £113 per year less than the projected NIW water charge of £334 in that year. 
 
NIW do not make explicit their expected charge for 2013/14, but if the same domestic/commercial 
ratio is applied in 2013/14, then 67.8% of the NIW projection of  £424.8m. ‘revenue from customers’y 
would be paid by households, a figure of  £288.0m. Divided between 650,000 households, this implies a 
water charge of £443 per household.  The PSIRU illustrative alternative for 2013/14, recalculated on 
the same basis, implies a figure of £281,  £162 per year less than the NIW implied charge of £443. 
 
The calculation assumes that this distribution continues into the future: one consequence is that the 
government contribution remains small, much lower than the subsidy of £54m. set out in the strategic 
                                                     
x Excluding £7.9m. interest attributable to opening debt of £150m. assigned to NIW 
y Strategic Plan Appendix A p.41: profit and loss projections 
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business plan. Another is that the contribution from commercial users remains much smaller than that of 
households. Both these distributional issues could be reconsidered. 
Table 10.  An alternative budget for the NI water service: revenue (revised version) 
 
 
1999 2009/10 2013/14 
2013/14 increase 
over 1999 
 £m. 195 222 282  
Govt £m. 9 10 13  
Commercial users £m 36 68 87  
Households £m. 150 144 182  
Average annual rates payment per household £  127 221 281 +£154  
Water charge per household in NIW plans £  127 334 443 +£316 
Source: calculated from table 9, and NIW projections 
 
Other policy issues should be considered, for example by clarifying that privatisation is neither a short-term 
nor a long-term objective. This could be done by following the example of the Netherlands (and the plan of 
Italy) and making water privatisation illegal in Northern Ireland, as it is in the Netherlands. It is clear from 
the consultation exercise that the prospect of privatisation is unpopular in Northern Ireland, and should be 
clear from the earlier analysis that the use of privatisation as a model is at the root of many of the problems 
with the government proposals.  
Annexe: Comparative presentation of table 9 and 10 
Table 9 above is calculated by using the profit and loss  account projections in the Strategic Business Plan at 
Appendix A (p.41), adjusted by excluding  (a) transformation costs of the GoCo (b) dividend payments. In 
2013/14, these two elements are £54m. and £48m. respectively, and so their exclusion reduces the burden of 
financing by £102m.  
 
In the expenditure section, the figure for operating expenditure is reduced by the amount attributable to the 
transformation costs. The figures for PPPs, depreciation, infrastructure renewals charge remain unchanged 
from the SBP – although the depreciation and renewal charges would both be reduced if the capital 
expenditure programme itself  was revised downwards as a result of a public review.   
 
In the section on net surplus, the figure for interest payable is reduced only by £8m., which represents the 
interest payments due to  the opening burden of £150m. debt loaded onto the GoCo. The figure for dividends 
is set at zero, because that is assumed to be a policy objective of the alternative option.   
 
Other elements of the SBP profit and loss table are adjusted as a consequence of the proposed alternative.  
 
The figure for net surplus/deficit is assumed to be zero, because that is assumed to be a policy objective of 
the alternative option; and the figure for deferred tax is set at zero, as a consequence of the fact that the net 
surplus and dividends are both set to zero.  
 
In the calculation of revenue in Table 10,  the figures for government subsidy and rechargeables are both 
replaced by the calculation of the government contribution according to the distribution of the 1999 
financing. Finally, the assumed dowry payment is added back, representing a further government 
contribution.  
 
It should be noted that this does not result in an increased gross government contribution to revenue: the 
alternative proposal requires government funding of  £49m. in 2009/10 (made up of £10m. from the 1999 
formula, plus £39m. dowry) compared with SBP provision for government subsidy of £62.1m. ; in 2013/14 
the alternative provides for government contribution of  £13m. + £39m. = £52m,  compared to the SBP 
subsidy of  £54m. 
 
Table 11 on the next page sets out a full reconciliation between the profit and loss account of the SBP and 
the basis for the calculations in Tables 9 and 10.  
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Table 11.  Comparison of GoCo SBP and PSIRU options for 2009/10 and 2013/14 
  2009/10       2013/14       
  SBP 
App A 
PSIRU Difference Difference 
% 
SBP 
App A 
PSIRU Difference Difference 
% 
                  
Opex (excluding 
transformation) 
134.2 134.2 0.0 0% 141.7 141.7 0.0 0% 
Transformation costs 53.5 0.0 -53.5 -100% 54.2 0.0 -54.2 -100% 
Total opex 187.7 134.2 -53.5 -29% 195.9 141.7 -54.2 -28% 
PPP 37.7 37.7 0.0 0% 39.5 39.5 0.0 0% 
Depreciation 25.0 25.0 0.0 0% 38.0 38.0 0.0 0% 
Infrastructure renewal 40.8 40.8 0.0 0% 53.8 53.8 0.0 0% 
TOTAL 
EXPENDITURE 
291.2 237.7 -53.5 -18% 327.2 273.0 -54.2 -17% 
                  
Interest payable 30.7 22.8 -7.9 -26% 54.8 46.9 -7.9 -14% 
Dividend 36.0 0.0 -36.0 -100% 48.1 0.0 -48.1 -100% 
Deferred tax 19.0 0.0 -19.0 -100% 30.3 0.0 -30.3 -100% 
COSTS OF CAPITAL 85.7 22.8 -62.9 -73% 133.2 46.9 -86.3 -65% 
                  
TOTAL COSTS 376.9 260.5 -116.4 -31% 460.4 319.9 -140.5 -31% 
                  
REVENUE                 
Non-domestic   68.0       87.0     
Domestic   144.0       182.0     
Total income from 
customers 
319.8 212.0 -107.8 -34% 424.8 269.0 -155.8 -37% 
Government subsidy 62.1 10.0 -52.1 -84% 54.2 13.0 -41.2 -76% 
Rechargeables 3.5 0.0 -3.5 -100% 3.8 0.0 -3.8 -100% 
Dowry 0 39.0 39.0   0.0 39.0 39.0   
Total income from 
government/others 
65.6 49.0 -16.6 -25% 58.0 52.0 -6.0 -10% 
TOTAL REVENUE 385.4 261.0 -124.4 -32% 482.8 321.0 -161.8 -34% 
               
SURPLUS 8.4 0.5 -7.9 -94% 22.5 1.1 -21.4 -95% 
         
Implied average 
domestic payment 
334 221   443 281   
Source: calculated from SBP Appendix A and PSIRU calculations (for assumptions see text). Slight 
variations in figures are due to roundings in calculations. 
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